How did Iran cooperate with the US in the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq?

Iran cooperated extensively with the US in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Despite the fact that Iran has made its rhetoric against the US and Israel an official state discourse, its close cooperation with the US in the recent past, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, is quite remarkable.

When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, Tehran cooperated with them directly and by the Shia elements it supported.

This cooperation was documented in news articles, reports and video footage published by various sources, particularly those based in Iran.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, one of Iran's former presidents, confirmed this cooperation at first hand during his time in office. In a debate before the 2009 presidential elections, Ahmadinejad said the following:

"Mr Bush, despite all our cooperation in Afghanistan, has declared Iran an axis of evil."¹

Ahmadinejad's above statements, published by the official Iranian news agency IRNA

Ahmadinejad, who continued his statements in this direction in the following period, made a similar discourse in 2009, using the following statements:

"America has said that Iran is the axis of evil. They made such an insult when Iran was the country that cooperated with them the most in Afghanistan and Iraq."²

Ahmadinejad's above statements, published by the official Iranian news agency IRNA

Here are the documents and statements that reveal Iran's cooperation with the US in Afghanistan and Iraq:

The US-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan

Iran became one of the most influential parties in Afghanistan after the 1979 revolution. By supporting the Shia and Persian ethnic elements in Afghanistan, the Iranian regime gained a strong base. In particular, Hezbe Wahdat, formed by Shia Hazaras, became an effective proxy for Iran in Afghanistan.

With the rise to power of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan in the 1990s, Iran's influence in the region was on the wane. In parallel, relations between Iran and Afghanistan became strained, with the two countries sometimes coming to the brink of war.

Iran actively supported Northern Alliance elements fighting the Islamic Emirate in the region. Qassem Soleimani played a particularly active role in this process, travelling frequently to the region.

Iran provided the Northern Alliance forces with military training, weapons and technical assistance. These forces have made several attempts to take Kabul, which is under the control of the Islamic Emirate, but have failed.

Iranian general Qassem Soleimani with Ahmad Shah Massoud in northern Afghanistan, where he had gone to train Northern Alliance forces, 1993.

Iran's and Soleimani's support for anti-Taliban groups in the region began long before 1996, when the Taliban captured Kabul. Iranian sources describe Soleimani's thinking and Iran's position on the issue as follows:

"General Soleimani opposed a direct military attack on Afghanistan, pointing out that the Soviet Union lost 15,000 soldiers in a direct war with Afghanistan. According to him, unlike the Soviets, Iran should not put itself in danger. On the contrary, Soleimani proposed a guerrilla-style method of warfare and suggested supporting local Afghan resistance groups."³

The relevant part of the news article published by Mashregh News, which is close to the Iranian regime

These elements, supported, trained and equipped by Iran, were to serve as the ground forces in the US invasion that began in 2001. All components of the Northern Alliance acted in collaboration with the United States during the occupation and fought against the leadership of the Islamic Emirate.

In an interview in 2005, Mohsen Rezaee, a former senior commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and a senior figure in Iranian politics who has long served as secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, said the following about this situation in Afghanistan

"Iran's allies in Afghanistan and Iraq played an important role in overthrowing the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, and Iran provided them with the necessary support. Some Revolutionary Guard commanders advising the Northern Alliance played a key role in the capture of Kabul. These were forces specially trained in urban warfare and had gained experience in this area during the Iran-Iraq war. They were very effective and active in advising this group. However, American military propaganda quickly hijacked many of these successes."⁴

Air Force combat controller Staff Sergeant Bart Decker on horseback with Northern Alliance forces. Afghanistan, 2001.

American soldiers with Northern Alliance troops. Kunduz, Afghanistan, late 2001.

American soldiers with Northern Alliance troops. Takhar, Afghanistan, 15 November 2001.

On the other hand, it is also reported that between 1996 and 2001, Iran shared with the United States the location of important military centres of its neighbour, the Islamic Emirate, in the period immediately preceding the invasion:

"The cooperation between the two countries lasted through the initial phase of the war. At one point, the lead negotiator handed Crocker a map detailing the disposition of Taliban forces. 'Here's our advice: hit them here first, and then hit them over here. And here's the logic.' Stunned, Crocker asked 'Can I take notes?' The negotiator replied, 'You can keep the map.' The flow of information went both ways."⁵

Iranian government officials later confirmed that the US had been given a map. In 2017, senior Iranian diplomat Hossein Mousavian confirmed this, claiming that 'reformist circles' were responsible for the cooperation with the US. However, it was known that Iran was conducting this cooperation through military figures such as Soleimani, and that military figures were directly linked to the conservative camp and Iranian leader Ali Khamenei.

In a report in Kayhan, a newspaper close to Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei, Mousavian confirmed that the US had been given maps of Taliban centres and blamed ‘reformists’.⁶

Mohammad Khatami, who served as President of Iran between 1997 and 2005, expressed the cooperation with the US during the invasion of Afghanistan in the following words:

"Taliban was our enemy. America thought the Taliban was their enemy too. If they toppled the Taliban, it would serve the interests of Iran."

Khatami speaking in a 2009 BBC documentary⁷

Jawad Zarif, Iran's former foreign minister, also known as a reformist, said he worked closely with Soleimani during the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and that he also met with the US:

"In the Afghanistan negotiations with the United States in 2001, if it wasn't for Soleimani, I wouldn't have achieved anything. In Iraq in 2003, I would have achieved nothing without Soleimani's information."

Zarif's remarks, published by the official Iranian news agency IRNA⁸

When the Islamic Emirate government collapsed at the end of 2001 with the occupation of Afghanistan, the US and the countries of the region began efforts to establish a new government in Afghanistan. Iran was the strongest party at the table after the US. Iran, which actively cooperated with the US in the destruction of the government of the Islamic Emirate on the ground and in the occupation of Afghanistan, also had a say in the new government in order to protect its interests.

Iran gained a strong position in the new government through the military elements it supported on the ground, its own influence in the region and the Afghan politicians it supported diplomatically. Many Iranian-backed Shia Afghans, such as Karim Khalili, Sarwar Danish and Mohammad Muhaqqiq, were subsequently appointed to important positions in the new administration.

Biography | Sarwar Danish

While the occupation of Afghanistan continued, Iran was one of the main participants in the 2001 Bonn Conference organised by the US and Western powers. Iran itself participated directly in this conference, which designed the new Afghan administration. At the same time, one of the four Afghan delegations represented at the conference was the Iranian-backed 'Cyprus Group'. The representative of this group was Humayoun Jarir, who has lived in Iran for many years. Jarir was one of the signatories to the agreement reached after the conference.

When the conference reached an impasse, it was Iran that broke the deadlock and enabled the establishment of an administration headed by Hamid Karzai. Iran's representative at the conference, Jawad Zarif, persuaded the Northern Alliance factions to accept the Karzai government after a private meeting with Younus Qanooni, one of the Afghan leaders:

"Finally Zarif stood up, and signaled Qanooni to join him in the corner of the room. They spoke in whispers for no more than a minute. Qanooni then returned to the table and offered to give up two ministries. He also agreed to create three new ones that could be awarded to other factions. We had a deal. For the following six months, Afghanistan would be governed by an interim administration composed of 29 department heads plus a chairman. Sixteen of these posts would go to the Northern Alliance, just slightly more than half."

Zarif's persuasion of the Northern Alliance components⁹

While the conference established a new regime in Afghanistan, Iran had one of the biggest stakes in that new regime. Iran included in the government many names it supported, both from the Northern Alliance and other Hazara groups.

In the Afghan Interim Administration established as a result of the Bonn Conference, the most prominent names associated with Iran were as follows:

- Mohammad Muhaqqiq (Vice-Chair and Minister of Planning)

- Sayed Mustafa Kazemi (Minister of Commerce)

- Sayed Hossein Anwari (Minister of Agriculture)

- Sultan Hamid Sultan (Minister of Transport)

- Mohammad Fahim (Vice President and Minister of Defence)

- Younus Qanooni (Minister of Interior)

- Mirwais Sadiq (Minister of Labour and Social Affairs)

Humayoun Jarir (far left) signs the final declaration of the Bonn Conference on behalf of the Iranian-backed Afghan delegation. December 2001.

Karzai takes the oath of office before beginning his second term as president. On his left is Mohammad Fahim, a Northern Alliance commander, and on his right is Karim Khalili, an Iranian-backed figure. 2009.

Karim Khalili, an Iranian-backed Shia Hazara politician, has been appointed vice-president of the new US-backed government in Afghanistan. In this photo, Khalili discusses regional issues with US Ambassador to Afghanistan Robert P. Finn at his guesthouse in Bamyan on 2 August 2002.

Biography | Karim Khalili

After the US invasion in 2001, contacts between Iran and the new Afghan government continued. In this context, the then Iranian President Khatami held several meetings with Karzai, the leader of the US-backed administration in Afghanistan.

Report on the 2002 Khatami-Karzai meeting published by Iran's official news agency IRNA¹⁰

Despite Iran's open support for the US in its invasion of Afghanistan, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei argued the opposite in a 2003 speech. Khamenei claimed that "the Taliban was created by the US against Iran":

"The Taliban in the east of our country were organised by the Americans themselves. They were intellectually Salafist and very hostile to the Shia, Iran, the Islamic Revolution and the Imam. We knew this, it was very clear and we had numerous reports about it. (...) As a result, the Taliban were organised and nurtured by the Americans themselves."

Speech entitled "The organisation of the Taliban against Iran by the Americans", published on Khamenei's official website.¹⁴

Contrary to this claim, however, Iran under Khamenei continued to support the US-installed government in Afghanistan.

In the period that followed, the Karzai government continued to receive money and support from Iran in a variety of areas. In 2010, Karzai announced that his presidential office received about 700,000 euros from Iran once or twice a year. Karzai said:

"This is nothing hidden. We are grateful for Iranian help in this regard. The United States is doing the same thing. They're providing cash to some of our offices."¹¹

Karzai, the leader of the US-backed government, admits that Iran is providing them with money.

Iran's support for the US- and NATO-backed administration in Kabul continued in the years that followed. In addition to senior figures such as Karim Khalili, Mohammad Muhaqqiq, Sarwar Danish and Ismail Khan, many middle and lower level administrators, particularly Shia Hazaras, continued to have connections with Iran.

Iranian-backed official Mohammad Muhaqqiq meets with US Ambassador to Afghanistan John R. Bass, 2018.

Biography | Muhammad Muhaqqiq

Iran's support for the US-imposed regime in Afghanistan continued until August 2021, when it collapsed. Iran-connected figures within the regime also continued their anti-Taliban rhetoric into these final periods. For example, Sarwar Danish, one of these figures, argued in June 2021 that "the Taliban's war in Afghanistan is illegitimate from an Islamic point of view."¹²

With the US-backed government in Kabul on the verge of collapse, Iran's statements on the region emphasised that it did not want to see another Islamic Emirate government. In this regard, Iranian Foreign Minister Jawad Zarif made the following statements in April 2021:

"We need to put our differences aside and focus on our commons including the reality that the Islamic Emirate is an existential threat against Pakistan and a national security threat for Iran and India."¹³

The US-Iranian cooperation in Iraq

After the 1979 revolution, Iraqi Shiites were among the non-Iranian Shiite communities most supported by the Iranian regime. Even before the 1979 revolution, it was common practice for Shiites to travel along the Iran-Iraq line to study in different Shiite basins. After the 1979 Iranian revolution, many Shia groups, particularly in Iraq, were organised in Iran and their leaders established close ties with the Iranian regime. Organisations such as Islamic Dawa Party and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq gained power in Iran.

Although the links between the US and Iran in Iraq became more apparent in the period after the 2003 invasion, there was also a development before 2003 that underlined these links.

This was the Iran-Contra Affair, also known as 'Irangate'. In 1980, war broke out between the regime in Iran and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, which lasted until 1988. During this period of war, Iran, like Saddam, was known for its relations with the United States. In particular, the scandal that surfaced in 1986 revealed that Iran had been buying weapons from the United States. The United States had sold arms to Iran at a time when its relations with Iran were very tense, mainly through Israel. The proceeds were used to fund the guerrillas in Nicaragua.¹⁵

Iran's closest cooperation with the US began with the 2003 invasion. The above-mentioned statements by senior Iranian officials such as Ahmadinejad and Mohsen Rezaee were among the most important evidence of cooperation with the US.

In addition to its open support, which was revealed by these statements, Iran also provided serious support to the American occupation through the Iraqi Shiites loyal to it. Thanks to this support, the Saddam regime, which Iran had long regarded as a 'troublemaker', would be removed, the American occupation would continue for a while, and then the Iranian-backed Shiites, who remained the only organised force in the country, would take power. In fact, at the end of the process, Iran's plans of 2003 would be realised and the US would leave Iraq to the Shia groups and withdraw from the country.

During the US occupation of Iraq, the behaviour of Shia clerics living in Iran and directly linked to Iran shaped the field in a visible way. One of these was the fatwa of Iranian-backed Mohamed Baqer al-Hakim. Al-Hakim urged Iraqis 'not to take sides between Saddam and the United States' and asked them to stay out of the conflict. Al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, said in early April 2003, in the first weeks of the invasion:

"Now Iraqis are caught between Saddam Hussein's forces and the occupation forces. This is why I urge all Iraqis not to get involved in the fighting. They should not side, either with Saddam's forces, or with the US-led forces."

Although al-Hakim mentioned "the right of the Iraqi people to resist", he stated that this could only be realised if US forces remained in Iraq after Saddam was overthrown.

In other words, as stated above, the situation in question was based on "the US overthrowing Saddam Hussein and withdrawing from the country, leaving Iraq to the Shia groups."

Mohamed Baqer al-Hakim interview.¹⁶

Another fatwa was issued by Sistani. Sistani's fatwa, which urged Iraqis to 'remain neutral', has been the subject of debate for many years. Some people close to Sistani disagreed on whether the fatwa was issued or not. But the situation on the ground, in the shadow of the debates, was that the structures that followed Sistani did not take part in the clashes.

A news article of 4 April 2003 mentions Sistani's fatwa to Iraqi Shiites "not to fight against American forces".¹⁷

The news article contains the following statements:

"Until now the Shias of Iraq and the followers of Sistani were confused on whether to take up arms against the Americans, whether to fight. This is reassuring to everyone. The regime wanted to portray the Shias of Iraq and Sistani as supporting him [Saddam]."

After this period, Sistani's contacts with American officials continued. Sistani, who guided the formation of the new government with his fatwas and statements, was also in contact with Lewis Paul Bremer, the head of the American occupation administration. Bremer described his contacts with Sistani in his memoirs as follows:

"While both the Arab and the Western media lamented the supposed breachbetween Ayatollah Sistani and the Coalition, throughout the Coalition’s timein Iraq he and I communicated regularly on vital issues through intermediaries.

And Hume was right. In the early summer, Sistani had sent word to me thathis position had not been taken 'out of hostility to the Coalition.' Rather, the ayatollah believed that avoiding public contact with the Coalition allowed himto be more useful in 'our joint pursuits,' that he would forfeit some of his credibility among the faithful were he to cooperate openly with Coalition officials,as had many secular Shiites and Sunnis, as well as devout but lower-ranking Shia clergy."¹⁸

A June 2004 statement by Sistani, who had a major influence on the post-invasion government in Iraq, on the government to be formed and the elections to be held in the country.¹⁹

On 13 June 2003, following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the "Iraqi Governing Council" was established by the United States. Of the 25 members of the Council, 13 were Shia, including names with close links to Iran, such as:

- Mohammed Bahr al-Uloum

- Ibrahim al-Jaafari

- Ahmad Chalabi

- Iyad Allawi

- Abdul Aziz al-Hakim

- Ezzedine Salim

In the ensuing period, Iranian-backed Shiites continued to dominate all successive governments.

The Iranian-backed senior figures in the government also continued their contacts with and visits to the US. One of the prominent figures who came to the fore with these visits was Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, one of the most important Iranian-backed figures in Iraq. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim took part in the Shia uprisings in Iraq in the 1970s and, after spending time in prison, travelled to Iran in 1980. There he became one of the founders of a Shiite group called the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq. This Iranian-controlled group also took part in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim led the Badr Organisation, the group's armed wing.

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim was a senior figure in the US-backed administration set up in Iraq after 2003 and headed the interim government for a time.

Abdulaziz al-Hakim meets with then US President George Bush in Washington. 20 January 2004.

Abdulaziz al-Hakim meets with then US President George Bush in Washington. 20 December 2004.

During one of these visits, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim made the following statement:

"We have gone a long way to establish a democratic and pluralistic society in Iraq. We have given a great deal of sacrifice to achieving the objective. We cherish all the sacrifices that took place for the liberation and the freedom of Iraq, sacrifices by the Iraqi people, as well as friendly nations, and on top of that list, sacrifices by the Americans. We have now an elected government in Iraq, a government that is so determined to combat both violence and terror, a government that it is -- strongly believes in the unity of that government and of that country and the society, a government that deals and will deal with all the sources of terrorism regardless where they come from."²⁰

Nouri al-Maliki was one of the most prominent leaders of the US-backed administration established in Iraq after the invasion. Maliki, who served as prime minister between 2006 and 2014, was the longest-serving prime minister in the post-invasion period. Maliki, an Iraqi-born Shiite, fled the country in 1979 when it was discovered that he was a member of the Iranian-backed Shiite Islamic Dawa Party and had been living in Iran for a long time. After the 2003 invasion, Maliki returned to Iraq and became one of the key figures in the US-backed Baghdad government.

US President Bush and Nouri al-Maliki. 14 December 2008.

Nouri al-Maliki tries to protect Bush from a shoe thrown by an Iraqi journalist. 14 December 2008.

Maliki with Iranian leader Ali Khamenei. 4 December 2013.

Iranian-backed Shia groups have taken administrative and military positions in the new government. Many Shia groups were included in the new army created by the US. In particular, Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, which was made an important part of the newly established government, and the Badr Organisation, the armed wing of this structure, formed part of the army. The Badr Organisation also had great power within the Ministry of Interior and the police. It was said that the Ministry of Interior was completely in the hands of this group. These forces took part in various attacks, including the US attack on Fallujah in 2004, and were involved in attacks against the resistance in Iraq. The resistance was largely led by independent Sunni groups, with limited influence from Shia groups. ^{21, 22, 23}

Map of conflict-related deaths in Iraq between 2003 and 2006 (left) and sectarian map of Iraq (right). It can be seen that conflict and deaths are concentrated in Sunni-populated areas, while they are very low in other regions.

The toxic legacy of the US: Cases of leukaemia in Fallujah triple those in Hiroshima

Finally, after the American invasion in 2003, the military and political administration of Iraq was handed over to Iranian-backed Shia groups. These various Shia factions have continued to run the Iraqi government, army and law enforcement agencies. Many prominent Shia leaders, such as Abu Mahdi al-Muhdi al-Muhandis (MP 2006-2007), Hadi al-Amiri (Minister of Transport 2010-2014), Falih al-Fayyadh (National Security Adviser 2009-2020), were part of the US-led government during this period.

After the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, these groups continued to rule the country.

After 2014, all Iranian-backed militias in Iraq were united under the umbrella of the 'Hashd al-Shaabi', with the fatwa issued by Sistani on the grounds of 'fighting ISIS'.

Abdulmehdi Karbalai, Sistani's Friday Imam in Karbala, reads the 'fatwa of jihad' on behalf of Sistani, which established the Hashd al-Shaabi. 13 June 2014.

Subsequently, attacks against Sunnis in Iraq increased. In 2014, as the US sent troops back to Iraq, it became directly involved in Hashd al-Shaabi attacks in Iraq, providing air support. In addition to the US, the UK, France, Australia and Canada also provided air support for Hashd al-Shaabi attacks.

In these attacks, Sunni cities in Iraq were razed to the ground under the pretext of 'taking them back from ISIS'. The attacks on cities such as Ramadi, Fallujah and Mosul were carried out in joint operations by the US from the air and Shia militias backed by Iran from the ground. In Mosul alone, at least 40,000 civilians are known to have been massacred under the pretext of 'fighting ISIS'.

In early 2015, the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani was on the Tikrit front.²⁴ In the background are US-supplied military vehicles and US-trained and equipped Baghdad government forces. The city of Tikrit has been targeted by Iran, Shia militias, the US and its allies under the pretext of 'fighting ISIS', and many civilians have been killed in the attacks.^{25, 26, 27}

American warplanes carry out air strikes around Tikrit. 26 March 2015.²⁸

Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi elements advance in Fallujah. 28 June 2016.²⁹

US warplanes carry out airstrikes against alleged ‘ISIS members’ around Fallujah. July 2016.³⁰

US Special Forces are supporting Iranian-backed government forces and Shia militias in their offensive on Mosul. February 2017.³¹

US forces prepare for an offensive on Mosul at an airbase near the city. October 2016.³²

American forces bombing Mosul. September 2016.³³

Iranian-backed Shia militias are advancing in Mosul. The militias are using American-made military vehicles given by the United States to the Iran-backed government in Baghdad. October 2016.³⁴

US forces use phosphorus bombs on civilian areas in Mosul under attack from Iranian-backed Shia militias. June 2017.^{35, 36}

French special forces in Mosul. January 2017.³⁷

French artillery shelling Mosul. March 2017.³⁸

The city of Mosul, left in ruins after attacks by Iran, Shia militias, the US, Britain and France.³⁹

Hadi al-Amiri is one of the Iranian-backed Shia leaders in Iraq. Amiri, who has been close to Iran since the 1980s, also took part in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Amiri is the leader of the Badr Organisation, one of the main components of the Hashd al-Shaabi. In the interview here, Amiri confirms that the US has provided them with air support. Amiri states that there are about 50 Iranian military advisers in the region with Qassem Soleimani in the war in the region, in addition to 7 to 8 thousand American advisers, and that they do not oppose Soleimani's presence in the region.

1 https://www.irna.ir/news/9297730/%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B8%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%86%DA%98%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%88%DB%8C-3

2 https://www.irna.ir/news/9294953/%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%86%DA%98%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%B4%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B2%D8%B1%DA%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

3 https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1397616/%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%DA%86%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DB%8C%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7%DA%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%84

4 https://web.archive.org/web/20130827051756/https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-06-09-iran-interview_x.htm

5 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander

6 https://kayhan.ir/fa/news/14327/%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%AA%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%88%DB%8C%DA%98%D9%87

7 https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00hydcg

8 https://www.irna.ir/news/84308761/%D8%B8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%81-%D8%A7%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C

9 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01636600903424833

10 https://www.irna.ir/news/5562679/%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%DA%A9-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-2

11 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/25/hamid-karzai-office-cash-iran

12 https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-will-drown-in-the-turbulent-wave-it-has-created-sarwar-danish/